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The Oil and Gas Lease in California:
Still A Landlord-Tenant
Relationship?
The modem oil and gas lease is designed to bridge the gap between
the landowner' and the oil and gas producer in order to develop oil and
gas resources. 2 In California the landowner has the right to explore for
oil and gas and produce whatever lies under his property.3 Usually,
however, the landowner does not have the specialized knowledge or
technological and capital resources required to conduct a modem oil
and gas operation and is, therefore, mainly interested in obtaining roy-
alties.4 The oil and gas producer, on the other hand, has refined the
complex technology designed to find and produce oil and gas. Al-
though the producer is experienced in solving the immense financing
problems associated with oil and gas resource development, he does not
generally desire to purchase land where oil and gas might be found.
Because the chances of finding commercial quantities at any given lo-
cation may be slim, many thousands of acres of land must be explored
to improve the chances of discovery. Purchasing land outright would
quickly deplete a producer's capital resources needed for costly explo-
ration operations.5
The oil and gas lease, then, is designed to serve the needs of both
parties. The landowner-lessor conveys the rights to explore, develop,
and produce oil and gas to the producer-lessee.6 In return, the lessor
receives a cash bonus for signing the lease7 and a royalty, i.e., a negoti-
I. Recognizing that an oil and gas mineral interest is severable from the surface estate in
California, this comment will, nevertheless, refer to the owner of the mineral interest as the "land-
owner" or "lessor." See generally I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §209 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as I WILLIAMS & MEYERS].
2. For a description of the oil and gas lease in California see Blake, The Oiland Gas Lease,
Part !, 13 S. CAL. L. REv. 304 (1940); Blake, he Oil and Gas Lease, Part II, 13 S. CAL. L. REa.
393 (1940); Hightower, The Oil and Gas Lease in California, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 424 (1956).
3. See Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 585, 594, 446 P.2d 1006, 1011,
72 Cal. Rptr. 886, 891 (1968); Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 879, 442 P.2d 692, 705, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 612, 625 (1968); Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. 2d 637, 649, 52 P.2d 237, 243
(1935).
4. See 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW §601, at 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 3
WILLIAMS].
5. See 3 VILLIAMS, supra note 4, §601.
6. See 3 WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §601.
7. Bonus is the cash consideration paid by the lessee for the execution of an oil and gas lease
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ated fraction of the oil and gas actually produced." Additionally, the
lessor retains a reversionary interest.9 In these respects, most oil and
gas leases are similar.10
An oil and gas lease typically does more than exchange the rights to
explore, develop, and produce for royalty; it usually contains various
covenants which address the particular needs of each party.II Whether
covenants are included in a lease to protect and promote the lessor's
and lessee's rights under the lease depends upon the parties' needs,
foresight, and their respective negotiating power. To the extent these
elements vary in individual leasing situations, oil and gas leases can be
expected to be different.
Despite the tailoring of the agreement to reach a mutual objective,
California courts have tended at times to view the agreement as merely
another ordinary lease of land,12 analogizing the relationship created as
one of landlord and tenant. When the California courts make this
analogy a basis for applying the law of landlord and tenant to an oil
and gas lease, problems arise for both the lessor and the lessee.1 3 These
applications of landlord and tenant law to oil and gas leases are traps
for the unwary 4 who do not realize that the agreement to lease land for
oil and gas development might be viewed by the courts as creating a
landlord and tenant relationship.' 5 The unfortunate result is that a les-
sor might be unable to enforce rights he thought he had against a sub-
lessee, 16 and a lessee may discover that he has lost his lease for reasons
by a landowner, and is to be distinguished from delay rentals and royalty. 1 WILLIAMS & MEv-
ERS, supra note 1, §301, at 434-36.
8. A share of the oil or gas produced by the lessee reserved to the owner. The royalty may
be taken in kind or may be paid for from the proceeds the lessee receives from sale. 1 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 1, §301, at 436-37.
9. See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §301, at 437.
10. See 3 WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §601, at 2.
11. See Montana-Fresno Oil & Gas Co. v. Powell, 219 Cal. App. 2d 653, 659, 33 Cal. Rptr.
401, 404 (1963).
12. See generally Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil and Gas Co., 39 Cal. 2d 93, 244 P.2d
895 (1952); Hancock Oil Co. v. Hopkins, 24 Cal. 2d 497, 150 P.2d 463 (1944); Hartman Ranch Co.
v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937); Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil
Co., 214 Cal. 435, 6 P.2d 71 (1931); Kline v. Guaranty Oil Co., 167 Cal. 476, 140 P. 41 (1913);
Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957); Taylor v. Continental Southern
Corp., 131 Cal. App. 2d 267, 280 P.2d 514 (1955); Chase v. Trimble, 69 Cal. App. 2d 44, 158 P.2d
247 (1945). But see Graciosa Oil Co. v. County of Santa Barbara, 155 Cal. 140, 99 P. 483 (1909);
Stone v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal. App. 192 (1931).
13. See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §202.1, at 21 n.2.
14. See Hutchinson, The Sublease Trap, 3 NAT. RESOURCE L. 548, 548 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Hutchinson].
15. MERILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LESES §178, at - (2d ed. 1940) [here-
inafter cited as MERRILL]; Logan, Nonproducer Speculation in Oil and Gas: Sublease andAssigno
ment, 4 KAN. L. Rnv. 396 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Logan].
16. See Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232,242-43,73 P.2d 1163, 1168
(1937).
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not contemplated by the parties when they executed the lease. 17
Applications of landlord and tenant law to oil and gas leases exist
not only as traps for the unwary but also as precedent for further appli-
cation of landlord and tenant doctrines to the law of oil and gas. Con-
sequently, even one familiar with California law cannot be certain
when a court will view the oil and gas leasing agreement through old
spectacles of common law property notions rather than considering the
intent of the parties in light of the customs of the oil and gas business.
This comment will argue that California courts should not apply
landlord and tenant doctrines to determine the rights and duties cre-
ated under an oil and gas lease. Ancient common law doctrines
designed to meet the needs of an agricultural society are not suited to
provide just and predictable results consistent with energy needs. In-
stead, the lease should be recognized as a complex instrument expres-
sing the intent of the parties to create a specialized relationship
designed to promote the development of oil and gas resources to their
mutual profit.
The following sections of this comment will illustrate how California
has extended landlord and tenant doctrines and remedies to the field of
oil and gas leases. This comment will show that the oil and gas lease
should not be viewed as creating a landlord-tenant relationship
through an examination of the adverse impact on oil and gas leasing
arrangements resulting from the use of the common law distinction be-
tween assignments and subleases, 8 and from an analogy of royalty to
rent to support the extension of the California holdover tenant stat-
ute, 19 and from the potential extension of the unlawful detainer stat-
ute.2 Following the discussion of these issues, this comment will
present recommendations designed to correct identified inequities.2'
The assignment-sublease distinction was developed to resolve
problems which arise in a context that is significantly dissimilar to the
oil and gas business. Analogizing the relationship of the mineral lessor
and lessee to that of the landlord and tenant can result in ignoring the
expressed intent of the parties to an oil and gas lease. Consequently, a
realistic analysis of the problems the lease agreement attempts to re-
solve is sacrificed in favor of a mechanical application of archaic com-
mon law doctrines. The assignment and sublease distinction extended
to the oil and gas lease is one example of this shortsighted analysis.
17. See Martin v. Pacific Southwest Royalties, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 2d 161, 168, 106 P.2d 443,
447 (1940).
18. See notes 22-108 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 125-158 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 159-178 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 179-206 and accompanying text infra.
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THE ASSIGNMENT-SUBLEASE DISTINCTION EXTENDED TO
OIL AND GAS LEASES IN CALIFORNIA
When an oil and gas lessee transfers his lease interest to a third party,
the question arises whether the transfer operates as an assignment of
the lease or creates a sublease. At common law, different legal conse-
quences attach to a transfer by the lessee of his lease interest depending
on whether the transfer is classified as an assignment or a sublease.
22 If
the transfer is an assignment, the transferee is in privity of estate with
the lessor and, therefore, liable to him on all covenants in the original
lease23 that run with the land.24 If, on the other hand, the transfer is
classified as a sublease, a new tenancy is created between the lessee and
the sublessee25 There is no privity of estate between the lessor and the
sublessee, thereby precluding sublessee liability to the lessor on the
covenants in the original lease.26 Because the transferee is not a party
to the original lease, privity of contract can not stand as a basis of lia-
bility, absent an express assumption.27 Since a lessor might be pre-
cluded from holding a sublessee directly for damages resulting from a
breach of covenant, the characterization of the transfer becomes
critical.
In California, when a lessee transfers his entire estate to another, the
transfer operates as an assignment.2" If the lessee transfers less than his
entire estate, then the transfer does not operate as an assignment, but
instead creates a new tenancy between the lessee and his transferee.29
The important question thus becomes what minimum interest in the
leasehold, retained by the lessee, is sufficient to classify the transfer as a
sublease.
To create a sublease the lessee retains a reversionary interest. In a
majority of American states3° a reversion is created only when the
lessee transfers an interest in the leasehold to the transferee which is of
shorter duration than the lessee's original interest.3' Even if the term of
22. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.57, at 297 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
cited as ALP].
23. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 297.
24. "Every covenant contained in a grant of an estate in real property, which is made for the
direct benefit of the property, or some part of it then in existence, runs with the land." CAL. CIV.
CODE §1462.
25. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 297.
26. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 297.
27. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 297.
28. See Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 242, 73 P.2d 1163, 1168
(1937).
29. See id. at 243, 73 P.2d at 1168.
30. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 298.
31. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 297-98.
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the sublease expires a single day before his own, the lessee has created
a sublease.
In California, as well as in a number of other states,32 a sublease may
be created even when the entire possessory right is transferred by re-
serving a power of termination.33 In the seminal Massachusetts case of
Dunlap v. Bullard,34 a covenant by the sublessee to pay rent to the
lessee at an increased rate was deemed a reversionary interest in the
lessee, and the court classified the transfer a sublease,35 stating that:
To constitute an assignment of a leasehold interest, the assignee must
take precisely the same estate in the whole or in part of the leased
premises which his assignor had therein ... 36
On the other hand, a sublease results when:
• . . by the terms of the conveyance. . . new conditions with a right
of entry or new causes of forfeiture are created, then the tenant holds
by a different tenure, and a new leasehold interest arises, which can-
not be treated as an assignment or a continuation to him of the origi-
nal term.37
The common law assignment-sublease distinction developed to meet
specific needs of owners of interests in land.3  By creating a sublease, a
tenant for a term of years could alienate a portion of his interest and
still retain the status bestowed by ownership. 39 Retaining a reversion,
even for a day, created a sublease so that the tenant could maintain this
position. Should the tenant transfer his entire term, he lost any interest
he had in the land.4°
The advantages of one form of transfer over another have disap-
peared over time.4 I Today the common law distinction between an as-
signment and sublease is a mere technicality which should yield to the
intention of the parties.42 The following subsections illustrate that the
distinction is inappropriately applied not only because the oil and gas
lease is dissimilar to an ordinary lease, but also because the conse-
32. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 298.
33. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 298.
34. 131 Mass. 161 (1881).
35. See id. at 162.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 249-50 (2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter
cited as HOLDSWORTH].
39. In feudal law, land was always held "of the king either immediately or mediately." Each
person in the chain of holding owed duties to his overlord such as military service or the payment
of rents. To enforce these duties the landlord had the remedy of distress. Under this view of
society, therefore, each person must have an estate in order to maintain his position in the chain of
ownership. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 232-37 (2d ed.
1968).
40. See Jaber v. Miller, 219 Ark. 59, 62, 239 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1951).
41. See id. at 65, 239 S.W.2d at 763.
42. See id. at 66, 239 S.W.2d at 763-64.
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quences of the distinction can lead to consequences contrary to the in-
tentions of the lessor and lessee when they negotiated the lease.
A1. The Assignment-Sublease Distinction Applied to
Trans./ers of the Oil and Gas Lease
In Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co.,43 the California
Supreme Court extended the common law distinction between assign-
ments and subleases to the transfer of an oil and gas lease.' In Hart-
man Ranch, the lessor sued the transferee of the lease for damages
resulting from a breach of the implied covenant to protect against
drainage a.4  Although the court found that the transferee of the lease
had allowed unreasonable drainage to nearby properties, 46 the lessor
had no cause of action against the transferee-sublessee because the
transfer was characterized as a sublease, rather than an assignment.47
Since the court applied the assignment-sublease distinction without
considering whether the parties intended to adopt the legal conse-
quences of a sublease, it becomes essential to know when a transfer will
be viewed as a sublease.48 Otherwise, unwary parties to a lease transfer
could fall into the sublease trap.
Unfortunately, there is no agreement on what minimum quantum
and quality of retained interest in the lessee is sufficient to classify the
lease transfer as a sublease rather than an assignment.49 In Hartman
Ranch, the court committed California to the Massachusetts rule defin-
ing the type of retained interest or power which will prevent the trans-
fer from operating as an assignment.5 0  The court noted that the
transfer instrument under which the sublessee gained possession of the
premises reserved a larger royalty in the lessee than that provided for in
the original lease.5 The lessee also retained a right of re-entry for
breach of any stipulation in the transfer agreement.52 Committed to
the Massachusetts rule, the Hartman Ranch court concluded that:
43. 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937).
44. See id. at 242, 73 P.2d at 1168.
45. This covenant creates a contractual duty, either express or implied, to use due diligence to
protect the leasehold from drainage ofoil or gas which may be occurring as a result of production
operations conducted at another part of the same oil or gas field. When the duty is an implied
one, the lessee must drill an offset well if substantial drainage is taking place and if an ordinarily
prudent operator would do so under similar circumstances. See generally 5 H. WILLIAMS & C.
EYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§821-826.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS].
46. See 10 Cal. 2d at 241-42, 73 P.2d at 1168.
47. See id. at 242-43, 73 P.2d at 1168. The court subsequently allowed recovery on a third
party beneficiary theory. See id. at 243-47, 73 P.2d at 1168-69.
48. See Logan, supra note 15, at 418.
49. See notes 54-61 and accompanying text infra.
50. 10 Cal. 2d at 243, 73 P.2d at 1168.
51. See id. at 242-43, 73 P.2d at 1168.
52. See id. at 243, 73 P.2d at 1168.
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where the transferor reserves the right to re-entry for breach of con-
ditions he has a 'contingent reversionary interest' which prevents his
transfer from operating as an assignment of the whole unexpired
term. Instead, a sublease arises.
53
Later California cases have not clearly stated whether retention of an
overriding royalty in the lessee without a right of re-entry for breach of
covenant is sufficient by itself to denominate the transfer a sublease. In
Chase v. Trimble,54 the California Second District Court of Appeal
found that reservation of a two and one-half percent overriding royalty
alone did not make the transfer a sublease." In Garner v. Knudsen,
5 6
however, the court was faced with a transfer in which the parties ex-
pressly agreed that the "[a]ssignors shall not have. . . any right to en-
force any of the terms ...as against [the] [a]ssignee."57 The only
rights retained were an overriding royalty, and the benefit of a cove-
nant requiring the "assignee" to give the "assignor" written notice of
intent to surrender the lease and to reassign it to the assignors upon
their timely request.5" As the court deemed this surrender clause the
functional equivalent of a right of re-entry,59 a sublease arose. 60 This
decision shows the willingness of the courts to use a flexible definition
of the sublease in order to further a particular policy-in this case, sup-
porting the lessor's ability to clear title of fractional interests carved out
of the working interest. Although the result may be proper under the
circumstances, using the sublease rationale to expand the sublease
classification to accomodate the facts of the case creates precedent for
further expansion of the sublease distinction in the field of oil and
gas.61 In light of the undesirable consequences of the distinction, it
would be preferable to base the decision squarely on the identified
policy.
B. The Effect of the Assignment-Sublease Distinction
of Classfication of Oil and Gas Lease Transfers
Whether it is ultimately held that a sublease is created by retaining
an overriding royalty alone without also retaining a right of re-entry,
53. See id.
54. 69 Cal. App. 2d 44, 158 P.2d 247 (1945).
55. See id. at 49-50, 158 P.2d at 250.
56. 129 Cal. App. 2d 747, 277 P.2d 890 (1954).
57. Id. at 749 n.2, 277 P.2d at 892 n.2.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 755-56, 277 P.2d at 896.
60. See id. at 756, 277 P.2d at 896.
61. Language in the Garner opinion indicates that retaining an overriding royalty alone is
sufficient to create a sublease. For example, the Garner court cites AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE to
the effect that " . . . a transfer of the leasehold . . . will be deemed a sublease if he reserves a
rental or an overriding royalty." Id. at 755, 277 P.2d at 895.
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many lease transfers in California may be so classified.62 If oil and gas
lease transfers were sold outright by the lessee to a transferee, then the
assignment-sublease distinction would not be of major significance.63
Yet because the oil and gas lease is an attractive investment, 64 and be-
cause financing methods are designed to spread the risk of leasehold
development65 and promote capital formation,66 retained interests of
the type held to create subleases67 are common. In the ordinary course
of the oil and gas business, part or all of an oil and gas lease is often
transferred at least once before production is obtained.68 Since a large
capital investment is not required,69 professional "lease brokers" make
a business of acquiring oil and gas leases, usually with no intention of
obtaining production themselves. 70  In addition, favorable tax treat-
ment7" and the possibility of sharing the profits of an oil strike also
make the oil and gas lease an attractive investment.72 The oil and gas
lease rights thus obtained can be transferred for a profit to other specu-
lators when interest in the area is high or to a party intending to explore
and develop the lease.73 Rather than selling the lease for cash consider-
ation, many brokers prefer to retain an overriding royalty, allowing
them to share in any profits of a discovery.74
Besides receiving cash or retaining an overriding royalty, lessees
commonly obtain consideration for transferring all or part of a lease by
reserving an oil payment.75 This payment is a right to a share of oil
produced from the leased premises and terminates when a certain vol-
62. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 14, Logan, supra note 15.
63. Because no contingent reversionary interest is retained, the transfer is an assignment and
privity of estate between the lessor and the transferee will support an action by the lessor against
the transferee. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.57, at 297.
64. See Logan, supra note 15, at 396.
65. A common method of obtaining a lease is by transfer, and reservation of an overriding
royalty in the transferor. See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW §418, at 340 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. Another form of consideration for the transfer of a
lease is an oil payment. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS §422, at 369-70.
66. Brown, Assignments of Interests in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out 4greements, Bottom
Hole Letters, Reservations of Overrides and Oii Payments, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFrH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION AS IT AFFECTS THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY,
25, 36 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
67. See notes 49-61 and accompanying text supra.
68. See Warren, Transfer of the Ciiand Gas Lessee'r Interest, 34 TEX. L. REV. 386, 386 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Warren].
69. Logan, supra note 15, at 396.
70. "A person who seeks to secure leases for speculation and resale in areas where survey or
exploration work is being done." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS TERMS, 242 (3d ed.
1971).
71. Logan, supra note 15, at 396.
72. See Logan, supra note 15, at 396.
73. See Warren, supra note 68, at 386-87.
74. See Warren, supra note 68, at 388; Logan, supra note 15, at 396.
75. An oil payment is a share of the oil produced without deduction for the costs of produc-
tion. The payment terminates when a stated amount of production is attained, or a statedsum is
paid. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, §422, at 365-66.
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ume is produced or a fixed sum is paid.76 Despite the difference be-
tween the duration of the oil payment and an overriding royalty, they
are substantially similar in effect." By reserving an economic interest
in the lease, the lessee-transferor does not convey his entire interest-
the distinctive feature of the sublease. Although California courts have
not held that an oil payment creates a sublease, no logical reason exists
for distinguishing it from an overriding royalty.
78
Even when the parties to an oil and gas lease transfer understand
that retaining interests may prevent an assignment, attempts to draft
the transfer instrument to preclude a judicial finding of a sublease can
be unpredictable. In Higgins v. Exeter Oil Co. , a lessee entered into a
"contract of employment" with the party who was to develop the lease.
To circumvent a covenant in the original lease prohibiting both assign-
ments and subleases, the instrument recited that the lease owner, Exeter
Oil, desired to hire Barnsdall Co. to drill and thereafter operate an oil
and gas well for Exeter.80 In finding the contract was neither an assign-
ment nor a sublease, the Higgins court noted that the letter:
contained no words of transfer or assignment of any estate in any
real property; ... The Exeter Company retained possession of the
premises, and there was lacking those persuasive elements of a sub-
lease-exclusive possession, a fixed term, a fixed rental and right of
re-entry in event of covenant broken. 1
Although the instrument was substantially in the form of a sublease
because Exeter retained the functional equivalents of a royalty interest
and a right of termination for breach of contract while Barnsdall un-
dertook all development and operations subject to reimbursement, the
court distinguished this agreement from a sublease.82 As a result, the
76. See note 75 supra.
77. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, §422.3, at 376.
78. One commentator, confessing to difficulty understanding the reason for distinguishing
between the two interests, nevertheless believes that retaining an oil payment should not cause the
transfer to be classified as a sublease "as it reduces the number of transfers to be classified as
subleases rather than assignments." 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, §413.4, at 333-34.
79. 45 Cal. App. 2d 792, 115 P.2d 13 (1941).
80. If Barnsdall were unsuccessful in the first well, it had the option of terminating the lease
or commencing another. Barnsdall was also authorized to enter and do all work on the premises
necessary to obtain production. All work and materials were provided by Barnsdall at its own
expense. Barnsdall was to be compensated as follows:
from all gas and oil sold from the well, one-sixth should be deducted as the landowner's
share. The remaining five-sixths should be paid to Barnsdall Oil Company until that
company had been fully reimbursed for moneys advanced in drilling and operating of
[sic] the well, and after being so reimbursed the lessee was to pay the Barnsdall Company
the costs of operation and sixty percent of the remaining five-sixths. . . . In case of
default, the Exeter Oil Company could, after notice, terminate the contract. ...
It was further expressly provided that the contract was not intended to convey or assign any inter-
est in the premises. Id. at 794, 115 P.2d at 14.
81. Id at 795, 115 P.2d at 14.
82. See id., 115 P.2d at 14.
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convenant precluding lease transfers was not breached, and therefore
was not a ground for forfeiture under a forfeiture clause.8 3
The contracting parties in Higgins knew of the potential conse-
quences of reserving an override and a right of re-entry and so drafted
a contract to avoid them. Because most lease transferors wish to con-
clude their liability on the lease and pass ownership of the rights cre-
ated under it,84 a transferor required to undertake operating duties to
preclude a judicial finding of a sublease, as in Higgins, is faced with an
undesirable agreement. Parties to many lease transfers also may not
fully contemplate the legal consequences attending the lease transfer.8 -
As the following sections illustrate, the legal consequences of the as-
signment-sublease distinction do not justify its continued application to
oil and gas leases.
L Legal Consequences of the Assignment-Sublease Distinction
When a lessee transfers his entire lease interest, the transfer operates
as an assignment.86 The transferee is in privity of estate with the lessor
and liable on all covenants in the original lease which run with the
land. In a sublease, however, privity of estate does not exist, and the
sublessee owes no duty to the lessor on the covenants in the original
lease. In Hartman Ranch, the court employed this reasoning to pre-
clude sublessee liability in damages to the lessor for breach of an im-
plied covenant after the court had characterized the lease transfer as a
sublease.87 Hartman Ranch has serious consequences for both the les-
sor and the original lessee because in many instances the parties en-
gaged in the oil and gas business do not intend a variance in the form
of a transfer to have major practical significance. 8  For instance, some
leases contain clauses permitting assignment of the lease and requiring
the lease covenants to extend to heirs, executors, and assignees. Courts
following the rule of strict construction of oil and gas leases find these
clauses refer only to assignments, not to subleases. Therefore, privity of
contract does not exist with respect to a transferee's duty to the lessor to
perform the covenants of the original lease. In Hartman Ranch, the
court found the transferee liable only because his express assumption
of the original lease evidenced his intent to benefit the lessor. This sup-
83. See id. at 793, 115 P.2d at 13.
84. See MERRILL, supra note 15, §178, at 398. Although a lessee remains liable to the lessor
on both express and implied covenants of the lease when privity of contract exists, normally a
lease contains a clause relieving the lessee of liability upon assignment. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 65, §403.1, at 263-64.
85. See Logan, supra note 15, at 396.
86. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Warren, supra note 68, at 409-10.
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ported the lessor's recovery on a third party beneficiary theory.89 One
commentator has submitted that the assumption is not a significant
enough indication of the parties' intent to make the variance in the
form yield practical results of such magnitude stemming from classify-
ing the transfer as a sublease.90 In most cases, the lessor probably
knows the person to whom he is giving a lease has no intention of per-
sonally exercising the operating rights obtained.9 The lessor executes
the lease anyway in the belief that the lessee is the best person to find a
party who will develop the lease for oil and gas.92 Thus, it is not con-
vincing to argue that after the lessor includes covenants concerning ac-
tivities of the lease operator, the lessor intended to bind only the non-
operating lessee, but not the operating transferee. The lease transferor
typically has no right to control the operations of the transferee. 93 The
operating transferee on the other hand has direct control of the opera-
tion and so is in the best position to cure any breach of covenant.94 The
lessor would thus prefer to hold the transferee directly responsible.
95
Another reason for binding the lessee's transferees to the original
lease covenants is that the lessee is frequently a lease broker who might
not be in a financial position to respond in damages to liability arising
out of a breach. In this case, the lessor would prefer to hold the lease
transferee liable because the transferee is often better able to pay a re-
sulting judgment.96 Precluding transferee liability for breach of cove-
nants on the ground that he is operating as a sublessee rather than as an
assignee is not based on a consideration of usual oil business realities.97
Examining the lessee's position, it is also difficult to find an intent on
his part to remain solely responsible for his transferee's operations.98
By creating a sublease rather than an assignment, the lessee has greatly
increased his chances of being sued for breaches caused by his trans-
feree. Yet, in the usual transfer, the lessee does not reserve any control
over the transferee's operations.99 This is inconsistent with an intent to
89. See Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 246, 73 P.2d 1163, 1169
(1937).
90. See MERRILL, supra note 15, §178, at 394.
91. See Warren, supra note 68, at 400.
92. See Warren, supra note 68, at 386.
93. See Warren, supra note 68, at 409.
94. See Warren, supra note 68, at 400.
95. See Brown, supra note 66, at 36.
96. See Brown, supra note 66, at 36.
97. See Hutchinson, supra note 14, at 550-5 1; Merrill, The PartialAssignee-Done in Oil, 20
Tex. L. Rev. 298, 322 (1942); Warren, supra note 68, at 400.
98. See Brown, supra note 66, at 37.
99. The party actually operating the lease may have taken his working interest after a long
chain of lease transfers. If the original lessee retained some control of the remote transferee's
operations, this would be a disruptive influence in the production process. See Warren,supra note
68, at 400-01.
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create a sublease. Concluding that a lessee is solely liable for any
breach is difficult to justify simply on the ground that the lessee desired
to share in the profit of a possible oil strike by retaining an overriding
royalty interest.100
In Hartman Ranch, the court was able to avoid the harsh result of
finding the transferee not liable to the lessor for breach of a lease cove-
nant by adopting the theory that the lessor was a third party beneficiary
of the transfer agreement between the lessee and the transferee. 101 The
court found the transferee had expressly assumed the covenants in the
original lease, thus inferring an intent by the lessee to secure the dis-
charge of his debt or performance of his duty to the lessor. 102
Subsequent to Hartman Ranch, a wary lessor should include a lease
covenant requiring that all lease transferees expressly assume the cove-
nants of the original lease. Even so, this will be insufficient to provide
an avenue of recovery to the unwary landowner or to those who en-
tered pre-Hartman Ranch leases, not recognizing the necessity of such a
clause.
2 Impact of Hartman Ranch
The Hartman Ranch decision stands as precedent for further applica-
tions of landlord and tenant law to oil and gas leasing. However, the
case lacks an analysis of similarities of the relationship created by an
oil and gas lease to that of landlord and tenant, as well as a considera-
tion of how any similarities justify extending the rule of landlord and
tenant law to oil and gas leasing. California courts have not consist-
ently adopted a uniform definition of a sublease, nor have the common
law consequences of such a distinction been uniformly applied in the
oil and gas field. Predicting when a California court will rely on an
incident of the assignment-sublease distinction to decide a case is,
therefore, made difficult.
For example, in Chase v. Trimble,10 3 the issue was whether a trans-
feree's surrender of an oil and gas lease to the lessor extinguished the
original lessee's overriding royalty."° The common law rule is that an
assignee or sublessee can not surrender a lease so as to affect the rights
of the transferor.105 Therefore, it would appear that a sublessee surren-
100. See Warren, supra note 68, at 409.
101. See Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 245-47, 73 P.2d 1163,
1169-70 (1937).
102. The court found that the transferee had expressly assumed the covenants in the original
lease, thus inferring an intent by the lessee to secure the discharge of his debt or performance of
his duty to the third party. See 10 Cal. 2d at 243-47, 73 P.2d at 1169-170.
103. 69 Cal. App. 2d 44, 158 P.2d 247 (1945).
104. See id. at 47, 158 P.2d at 248-49.
105. See Rosenberg v. Taft, 94 Vt. 458, 111 A. 583 (1920).
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der will not extinguish the overriding royalty. The Chase court held
that the lessee's overriding royalty was extinguished because the trans-
feree was actually an assignee since a right of re-entry was not re-
tained. 106 California authority that retaining an overriding royalty
alone creates a sublease 0 7 was ignored. Thus, a practicing attorney
may conclude either that an assignment will be found unless a right of
re-entry is retained along with an overriding royalty or that character-
izing a transfer as a sublease is not dispositive of this issue. If the latter,
California has departed from the common law when the assignment-
sublease distinction is potentially most valuable to the lessee. Permit-
ting the transferee to extinguish the lessee's overriding royalty leaves
the lessee vulnerable to having his overriding royalty extinguished at
the transferee's option.
The salient problem then is to find which features of a relationship
created under an oil and gas lease are sufficiently analogous to a land-
lord-tenant relationship to support application of landlord-tenant doc-
trines. California courts unfortunately have proffered little clear
guidance on this issue. This comment submits that before a landlord
and tenant concept is applied to the oil and gas lease the relationship of
lessor and lessee should be examined to determine whether the agree-
ment contemplated application of landlord and tenant principles. 08
A second area which may cause uncontemplated results is the anal-
ogy by California courts of oil and gas royalties to a landlord's rent.
The following section illustrates that the concepts of royalty and rent
should not be used interchangeably.
ANALOGIZING OIL ROYALTY TO A LANDLORD'S RENT
In California when the landowner-lessor executes an oil and gas
lease, he retains a reversionary interest and a right to royalty. Even if a
lease is not executed, the landowner has a royalty interest as part of the
rights of fee ownership which he can assign in whole or in part. 0 9 In
Callahan v. Martin, 110 the California Supreme Court held that this in-
terest is an incorporeal hereditament, the benefit of which can be held
in gross."' The court supported its conclusion with- the rationale that
royalty is synonomous with rent, "or so closely analogous to rent as to
partake of the incidents thereof.""l 2 Because at common law the right
106. See 69 Cal. App. 2d at 48, 158 P.2d at 250.
107. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
108. See Merrill, The PartialAssignee-Done in Oil, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 298, 302 (1942).
109. See Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 124, 43 P.2d 788, 793-94 (1935).
110. 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935).
Ill. See id. at 128, 43 P.2d at 797.
112. Id. at 123, 43 P.2d at 793.
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to future rents is classified as an incorporeal hereditament, 113 this anal-
ogy of royalty to rent served the Callahan court with a convenient ana-
logue from which it concluded that an assigned royalty interest
survived both the termination of the outstanding lease and the subse-
quent conveyance of the mineral estate by the assignor.
11 4
The function which royalty and rent perform in their respective
fields, however, is not analogous. Because the conception of royalty to
rent is incomplete, potentially misleading, and often contrary to the in-
tentions of the parties to the lease, the notion of royalty as rent should
be abandoned.
A. Is Royalty a Rent?
Rent has been defined as a:
return of certain amount, which is regarded as issuing out of the
land, as part of its actual or possible profits, and is payable by one
having an estate in the land as compensation for its use, possession
and enjoyment of the land, or occasionally, as a charge on the
land. 115
To assert that royalty payments are given to the lessor for the use of his
land is only partially correct. First, the lessee who uses the land for the
purpose of exploration may never owe the lessor a royalty payment if
no production is obtained.'16 In addition, the lessee may owe a royalty
to a non-participating mineral owner who has no right to use the land.
A more accurate statement is that royalty is owed not for use of the
land but for the right to extract minerals underlying the land.
Second, royalty owed is not a certain amount as is rent. Instead, the
amount of royalty owed directly depends on how much oil and gas is
produced.117 This factor also supports the view that royalty is not owed
just for the use of the land; the use of the land may remain constant,
whereas production, and resulting royalties, can increase or decrease.
In the usual oil and gas lease, payment of royalty does not function
directly to keep the lease in force, although non-payment of rent may
be a ground by which the lessor may put the lessee in default and de-
clare a forfeiture." 8 Even though the lessor enters into a leasing ar-
rangement under which he is entitled to royalty payments, the primary
objective of the lease is to obtain "paying production" of oil and gas."19
113. Id. at 124, 43 P.2d at 793.
114. See id.
115. 3 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §876 (3d ed. 1939).
116. See general, 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, §327.1.
117. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, §327.1.
118. See 3 WILLIAMS, supra note 4, §656.2, at 697.
119. See Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 15 (1935).
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Should the lessee fail to produce in paying quantities, the usual lease
expires automatically. 20
In California, paying production is generally defined as that amount
of production which will return a profit to the producer after paying
royalty and the costs of production. 2' The rationale is that a lessee
who is motivated solely by an intent to develop the potential oil and
gas resources will hold the lease only if it proves profitable. A lessee
who continues operations on the land without realizing a profit is
merely speculating on the future value of the lease at the lessor's ex-
pense. 122 The lessor intended to preclude this by making paying pro-
duction a special limitation to the duration of the oil and gas lease.1
2 3
In a sense, the limitation is an indirect method of insuring that the pro-
ducing lessee will use his best efforts to develop the oil and gas poten-
tial of the leased premises. 124
The danger in analogizing royalty to rent is that remedies designed
to address situations such as a landlord's acceptance of rent, or a ten-
ant's failure to pay rent, may be applied to similar situations in the oil
and gas context. Extending these remedies may result in the court re-
writing the lease to afford rights and remedies not initially contem-
plated at the time the lease was executed, thus providing for an
unbargained windfall.
B. Consequences of Analogizing Royalty to Rent
The problems created when royalty is analogized to rent will first be
illustrated by tracing the application of California's holdover tenant
doctrine to the field of oil and gas law. A problem created by the roy-
alty-rent analogue is that it can be used to support an extension of
rights and remedies designed to address the situation of landlord and
tenant.
L Common Law Holdover Tenant Doctrine
Under common law rules, a landlord has a choice of remedies when
faced with a tenant holding over after expiration of the lease.'2 The
120. The oil lease with a phrase stating that the lease continues so long after the end of the
primary term as production is in paying quantities creates a determinable fee which terminates
upon the happening of the named event. No notice is required, and no forfeiture results. Renner
v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 39 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 244 P.2d 895, 899 (1952); Montana-
Fresno Oil Co. v. Powell, 219 Cal. App. 2d 653, 666, 33 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1963).
121. See 39 Cal. 2d at 99, 244 P.2d at 899-900.




125. See 1 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §175, at 281 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter
cited as TIFFANY].
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landlord may elect to treat the holdover tenant as a trespasser. 126 The
landlord may bring an action for possession and an action for damages,
which may include the reasonable rental value of the premises during
the holdover period.
127
The landlord's second alternative is to treat the holdover tenant as a
tenant for another term rather than as a trespasser. 28 In California, it
has been held that "[v]ery slight acts on the part of the landlord, or a
short lapse of time, are sufficient to conclude his [the landlord's] elec-
tion and make the tenant his occupant."'129 At common law, the land-
lord's acceptance of rent from the holdover tenant raised a presumption
that an agreement for a new term had been made.' 30 This presumption
is now codified in California Civil Code Section 1945 which states in
part that:
[ilf a lessee of real property remains in possession thereof after the
expiration of the hiring, and the lessor accepts rent from him, the
parties are presumed to have renewed the hiring on the same
terms....
In Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co. ,"13 the California
Supreme Court applied Civil Code Section 1945 when asked to declare
the legal status of an oil and gas lessee in possession of the premises
under an expired lease. The lease had expired by its own terms when
paying production had not been obtained 32 at the end of the primary
term.' 33 Because the lessor continued to accept royalty payments ten-
dered by the lessee after the lease had expired, the court concluded that
a month-to-month tenancy was created.' 34 Furthermore, since the les-
sor did not give the prescribed thirty days notice of termination of the
lease, 35 the tenancy was not terminated, and the lessor's quiet title ac-
tion could not be sustained.
36
Thepresumption of a new tenancy arising from the landlord's accept-
ance of rent tendered by the holdover tenant is justified perhaps in the
126. See Samuels v. Singer, 1 Cal. App. 2d 545, 548, 36 P.2d 1098, 1102 (1934).
127. Cowell v. Snyder, 15 Cal. App. 634, 638, 115 P. 961, 963 (1911).
128. See TIFFANY, supra note 125, §175, at 281.
129. Cowell v. Snyder, 15 Cal. App. 634, 638, 115 P. 961, 963 (1911).
130. See Skaggs v. Elkus, 45 Cal. 154, 160 (1872).
131. 39 Cal. 2d 93, 244 P.2d 895 (1952).
132. Id. at 98, 244 P.2d at 899.
133. "The period of time, typically five or ten years, during which a lease may be kept alive by
a lessee even though there is no production in paying quantities by virtue of drilling operations on
the leased land or the payment of rentals." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS,
344-45 (3d ed. 1971).
134. 39 Cal. 2d at 102, 244 P.2d at 900.
135. "A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be re-
newed as stated in... [section 1945], at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the
parties gives written notice to the other of his intention to terminate the same. ... ." CAL. CIV.
CODE §1946.
136. 39 Cal. 2d at 102, 244 P.2d at 900.
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ordinary landlord and tenant relationship. 137 Whether this same pre-
sumption should arise when an oil and gas lessor accepts royalties from
the holdover lessee depends on the similarity between the relationships
created under an ordinary lease and those created by an oil and gas
lease. Because the kinds of operations usually found in the oil and gas
industry were not contemplated by the California Legislature at the
time Section 1945 was adopted in 1872,138 the two different types of
relations should be compared to determine whether it is appropriate to
apply the statute which raises a presumption of a month-to-month ten-
ancy to the oil and gas context.
Presumptions are devices by which the burdens of producing evi-
dence and of persuasion are shifted from one party to another. 39 The
following paragraphs set forth the policy protecting the lessor's right to
create a lease interest determinable upon the happening of a special
event. Because the presumption which arises under Section 1945 di-
lutes the protections which this policy was designed to achieve, it
should not be applied to the field of oil and gas.
The oil and gas lease typically expires automatically when produc-
tion falls below paying quantities.14° California recognizes and pro-
tects the lessor's right to provide for an automatic termination as a
method of describing the duration of the lease. 141 The lease continues,
not so long as royalties are received, but so long as paying production is
maintained. This mechanism protects the lessor from the speculator-
lessee who would otherwise be able to hold the lease by paying nomi-
nal royalties from a low level of production. 42 A primary reason for
using the limitation of "paying production," then, is to insure that oper-
ations on the lease are not merely speculative by providing incentive
for the lessee to develop the resource potential of the lease above mini-
mum levels. 43 Although maximum production is ordinarily in the
lessee's best interest also, when declining oil and gas production nears
the point at which the lessee makes no profit, the lessee must make a
choice. In order to keep the lease alive, he may choose to invest in
reworking the wells or commence secondary recovery operations, or he
may choose to surrender the lease. When the lessee knows he may be
137. See TIFFANY, supra note 125, §175, at 282-83.
138. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1945.
139. The reasons for creating presumptions may be out of considerations of fairness to the
parties, to correct for a party's superior access to items of proof, or out of social or economic
considerations. See McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §343, at 805-06 (2d ed. 1972).
140. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Bloomfield, 103 Cal. App. 2d 589, 591, 229 P.2d 838, 840
(1951).
141. See Montana-Fresno Oil and Gas Co. v. Powell, 219 Cal. App. 2d 653, 659-66, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 409 (1963).
142. See id., 33 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
143. See 103 Cal. App. 2d at 591, 229 P.2d at 840 (1951).
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liable for the full amount of oil produced above the cost of produc-
tion, ' or in the case of a bad-faith trespasser,'45 for the oil's gross
value, the lessee will either make the necessary investments to keep the
lease alive or quitclaim the lease.
The practical effect of the Renner decision146 provides the lessee
faced with the prospect of non-profitable production with a third alter-
native-he may continue to hold the lease by operating the stripper
well and recover any possible profits he may make while continuing to
pay royalty to the lessor. Because Renner holds that the lessee is oper-
ating under a month-to-month tenancy, 147 the lessee is not liable for the
oil and gas produced.' 48 As a result, there is less incentive for the lessee
to maintain production at paying quantities, and more protection for
the speculating lessee. 1
49
The Renner holding results in a retrenchment from the long-standing
policy protecting the lessor's ability to terminate automatically the
lease. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the lessor cannot termi-
nate the tenancy implied by law with thirty days' notice as provided in
Civil Code Section 1946.150 Section 1945 provides that the terms of the
tenancy created by the holdover statute are presumably the same as of
the previous tenancy.' 15  Most oil and gas leases are grants which con-
tinue so long as paying production is maintained.152 If this "thereafter"
clause 53 of the original lease is held to become a term of the lease
implied by Section 1945, a holdover lessee who later brings production
back up to paying quantities would continue to have the right to pro-
144. See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §226.2, at 378-79.
145. See I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note I, §226.1, at 373.
146. In Renner the court held that the leases had terminated when production had fallen be-
low paying quantities, which in the lease was defined as an average of fifty barrels of oil per day
for a period of thirty consecutive days. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the lessor's subse-
quent acceptance of regularly tendered royalties created a tenancy from month-to-month which
could not be terminated without giving notice. See notes 131-136 and accompanying text supra.
Cf. 219 Cal. App. 2d at 670-71, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (acceptance of irregularly tendered royalty
payments with long intervening gaps was not enough to create a month-to-month tenancy).
147. See note 148 and accompanying text infra.
148. The measure of damages for wrongful extraction of oil and gas depends on whether the
act is characterized as being in good faith or bad faith. The plaintiff can recover the value of oil
and gas extracted minus the costs of development, production, and operation from a good faith
trespasser. See I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §226.2, at 378-79. The bad faith trespasser,
however, is not entitled to a deduction for his costs. See I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1,
§226.1, at 373.
149. 103 Cal. App. 2d at 591, 229 P.2d at 840.
150. See Note, Oil and Gas: Use ofLandlord-Tenant Concepts in Construction of Leases. Rem-
edyfor Failure to Pay Royalties, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 485, 488 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Oil &
Gas].
151. CAL. CIv. CODE §1945.
152. See notes 142-145 supra.
153. See note 120 supra.
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duce so long as the profitable level of production is maintained.154 This
result should be avoided because the lessor would lose the chance to
renegotiate the lease, 55 and the lessee will be rewarded for his specula-
tive holding.
This comment does not suggest that the lessee should be exposed to
liability for operations on the leasehold when it appears from the con-
duct of the lessor that a lease exists between the lessor and the lessee.
This comment submits, however, that the lessee should not have the
benefit of a presumption. Instead, the burden should be on the lessee
to prove the existence of an implied lease, rather than on the lessor to
disprove it. This approach would more fully accord with the policy to
promote production 156 and to protect the lessor's ability to prevent
speculative holding." 7
Extending the holdover tenant statute to oil and gas leases is one
result of analogizing royalty to rent. A second occasion when Califor-
nia courts may rely on the royalty as rent concept involves application
of the California unlawful detainer statute 58 to terminate an oil and
gas lease in a manner not contemplated by the parties.
2 Unlawful Detainer is an Inapplicable Remedy
for Failure to Pay Royalty
A second hazard created by an analogy of royalty to rent is that it
will serve as a basis for applying the California unlawful detainer stat-
ute to forfeit a lessee's lease for failure to pay rent. The standard lease
reserves a royalty interest in the lessor' 59 and may also contain a cove-
nant requiring the lessee to make prompt payment of the royalty.'
60
Another common lease provision gives the lessor a right to declare a
forfeiture if the lessee breaches any of the substantial lease terms.'
61
Upon breach, the lessor may elect to put the lessee in default and termi-
nate the lease if the default is not cured within an agreed-on number of
154. The landlord's acceptance of rent has been held to create a new term and not merely an
extension of the old term. Earle v. Kelly, 21 Cal. App. 480, 485, 132 P. 262, 264 (1913). Civil
Code Section 1945 provides that the duration of the new term is presumed to be the same as the
prior term-not to exceed one year. It is clear that a lease in the primary term is not renewed
beyond a one year term by the acceptance of delay rentals. See Stetson v. Orland Oil Syndicate,
42 Cal. App. 2d 139, 142, 108 P.2d 463, 464-65 (1940). Where the lessee has regained paying
production which propels the lease into the "thereafter" term, a question remains as to whether
section 1945 will limit the determinable fee as well. See Oil & Gas, supra note 150, at 488.
155. See Oil & Gas, supra note 150, at 488.
156. See note 142-145 and accompanying text supra.
157. See note 142-145 and accompanying text supra.
158. CAL. CODE Cry. PROC. §1161.
159. See I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §202.3, at 25.
160. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, §428.8, at 485.
161. See 4 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW §681, at 313 (1980).
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days. 62 This right of forfeiture is the mutually agreed-on method by
which the lessor can terminate the lease for failure to pay royalty.
In 1872, California adopted an unlawful detainer statute 63 to pro-
vide a landlord with a summary remedy for the lessee's failure to pay
rent.164 In two separate opinions, California courts have strongly sug-
gested that an unlawful detainer action could be maintained against the
lessee for non-payment of royalty. In Martin v. Southwest Royalties,
Inc. ,165 the lessor brought an action for unlawful detainer and an ac-
tion to quiet title. The court noted the allegations in both counts had
been answered by the defendant lessee. Although the court appeared
to base its judgment on the quiet title count, it stated that:
Both the unlawful detainer and the quiet title counts of the complaint
were in fact answered by the defendant, thus putting all material al-
legations of both counts in issue. The evidence introduced was
equally applicable to both counts. The theory upon which the case
was tried is to be ascertained by reference to the issues framed by the
pleadings and to findings made by the courts (citation omitted)...
Assuming the unlawful detainer count to be defective, we must pre-
sume that the judgment was based solely upon the quiet title
count .... 166
The defect referred to in the opinion was that the plaintiff failed to give
the required notice, not that the statute was inapplicable to oil and gas
leases. 1
67
This decision has serious consequences for the lessee. In the ordi-
nary oil and gas lease, the lease is terminated automatically only on
failure to produce oil and gas in paying quantities. 68 The parties did
not agree to a summary right of termination on failure to pay roy-
alty. 169 Thus, a ruling extending the remedy of unlawful detainer
would be contrary to the express intent of the parties. Furthermore,
application of the unlawful detainer statute would give a windfall to
162. See 4 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW §682.1, at 340 (1980).
163. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1161.
164. A tenant of real property is guilty of an unlawful detainer if he continues in possession of
the premises after default in the payment of rent and is served with three days notice demanding
the sum due and owing. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1161. The right is designed to correct for
the common law rule that non-payment of rent by a tenant does not result in forfeiture of the lease
unless the lease expressly so provides. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.11, at 203. This was because at
common law the covenant to pay rent.was not dependent. See ALP, supra note 22, §3.11, at 202.
"The tenant can retain possession until the end of the term though it be morally certain that the
landlord will receive no rent." 3A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §13353, at 607 (J. Grimes ed.
1981). This rule has long been recognized in California. See Chipman v. Emeric, 3 Cal. 273, 283
(1853).
165. 41 Cal. App. 2d 161, 106 P.2d 433 (1940).
166. Id. at 168, 106 P.2d at 447.
167. Id.
168. See notes 130-132 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 158-161 and accompanying text supra.
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the lessor not bargaining for a right of re-entry for a breach of cove-
nant.170 The lessor gains an unbargained-for summary remedy for fail-
ure of the lessee to pay royalty.
Application of the unlawful detainer statute is an inappropriate rem-
edy in light of the normal operations of the oil and gas business. Roy-
alty payments may be delayed for many justified reasons. 17 1 Because
the royalty interest is freely alienable and also a lucrative investment
security, payment often may be delayed until the complexities of roy-
alty ownership can be determined by a reliable title search. 172 When
an area becomes the scene of increasing speculation, the oil person
must act swiftly to obtain a lease. Often there will be only enough time
to conduct a thorough search for mineral owners. 173 Once this is ac-
complished he can safely begin operating. Yet, because royalties are
severable from the mineral interest, questions of royalty ownership
have not been solved by the initial search.' 74 When a lease covers a
large area, it is not unusual to find numerous conveyances and parti-
tions to various royalty owners who must all be found and which con-
tribute to the delay.'
7 5
In addition to problems of title, delay may also be generated by com-
plexities in determining the price to be received from sales of oil to
buyers.' 76 Although this problem was much more complex before oil
and gas prices were deregulated, delay may still result when the price is
tied to contract contingencies of quality, time, place of delivery, and
accounting complexities.
In light of the large investment of time and money required to obtain
production under a lease, providing the lessor with the summary rem-
edy of unlawful detainer for non-payment of royalty imposes a heavy
burden on the oil and gas lessee. To protect himself from loss of a lease
for failure to pay royalty, the lessee may have to make a royalty pay-
ment based on estimates of the proceeds of a sale. To protect from
forfeiture by a royalty owner, the lessee may choose to make double
royalty payments to insure that the doubtful owner does not initiate
forfeiture proceedings when the owner discovers that he has an interest
170. Even when the original lease does not give the landlord a right to re-entry for breach of
the covenant to pay rent, the court may still give judgment for the lessor, returning possession to
him if payment has not been made within five days of notice. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§1174(c).
171. Arata, Timely Payment of Royalty, 11 Loy. L. REv. 163 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Arata].
172. See Arata, supra note 170, at 165-68.
173. See Arata, supra note 170, at 164-65.
174. See.Arata, supra note 170, at 165.
175. See Arata, supra note 170, at 165.
176. See Arata, supra note 170, at 172.
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in royalty.'77 When the parties to the oil and gas lease have expressly
agreed on a specific remedy and manner of enforcing the remedy in the
lease, it is inappropriate to extend the summary remedy which was
designed for a true landlord and tenant relationship to the oil and gas
field. Such an extension fails to recognize the special needs of the oil
and gas business.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A first step toward correcting inequities resulting from the applica-
tion of landlord and tenant doctrines is made when courts recognize
that these doctrines were an outgrowth of a society and economy based
on the land and agriculture. 17 The needs of today's large oil producers
have little in common with the feudal tenant. 79 The oil producer only
seeks to produce oil and gas from the land for the profits it returns;
ownership of an estate does not provide the producer with status. To
produce these resources, large capital investments must be made. The
oil producer often must negotiate with more than one landlord to ob-
tain drilling rights on enough land to make the operation successful.
The landowner for his part is not seeking to maintain a social status or
to put someone in possession for the rents that may be derived. He can
continue using his land as before, but now the opportunity exists to
share in the profits earned from producing oil and gas. 180
California courts have been reluctant to make a discriminating anal-
ysis of these differences as a basis for departure from common law doc-
trine. The courts often have noted that oil and gas leases are not easily
compared to ordinary usufructuary leases. In Callahan v. Martin, 8
the California Supreme Court stated that:
The difficulty experienced in defining with exactitude the nature of
the assignee's rights is due in part to the fact that the oil industry is of
very recent development, while in this country, by statute and judi-
cial precedent, our classification of property as realty or personalty is
based on common law definitions which crystalized in a time when
oil interests were not the subject of judicial cognizance.' 82
But after noting this problem, however, the California Supreme Court
relied on the analogy of royalty as rent without analyzing the ways in
which they are similar.8 3 As a result, California courts have cited this
177. See 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, §656.3, at 704.4.
178. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 248-50.
179. See Hutchinson, supra note 14, at 550-51.
180. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
181. 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d - (1935).
182. See id. at 115, 43 P.2d at 791.
183. See id. at 123, 43 P.2d at 795.
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opinion for the proposition of royalty as being rent and have still not
conducted the analysis needed to determine the differences between the
two. 1
84
Nevertheless, since the courts are generally sensitive to the real
problems of the parties coming before them, the results of many cases
are not subject to criticism. What is open to question is the use of legal
theory designed to meet another purpose; that is, the theory is extended
to oil and gas leases as a convenient argument to avoid reaching a bad
result.
In Hartman Ranch, for example, the court applied the assignment-
sublease distinction which was developed to meet the needs of an agri-
cultural society. To avoid an undesirable result, the court then looked
to a theory of third party beneficiary to support the lessor's recovery of
damages from the lessee. 185 A more realistic view of the transfer agree-
ment is that the parties intended it to have the effect of an assign-
ment. 186 Merely because the transferor retained certain economic
interests should not stand alone as evidence of the parties' intent to
create a sublease-at least for the purpose of extending the legal conse-
quences of a common law sublease." 7 These consequences should be
applied only upon a clear expression of intent in the lease or transfer
agreement.
The Canadian courts 8 8 have been sensitive to the oil and gas lease as
an expression of the parties' intent to create specific legal rights and
duties, holding that the oil and gas lease:
does not create the relation of landlord and tenant and the common
law rights and liabilities arising out of the relation of landlord and
tenant have no application to the agreement in question ....
Once the nature of the document is determined by a consideration
of "the true intendment of the instrument" (citation omitted) the
agreement is to be construed according to well-known rules of
construction.
The parties have entered into a contract which they clearly had the
right to make.' 8 9
Recognizing that an oil and gas lease is not appropriately classified as
creating a landlord and tenant relationship, ". . . the guiding principle,
184. See Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 585, 594, 446 P.2d 1006, 1015,
72 Cal. Rptr. 886, 893 (1968); Schiffman v. Richfield Oil Co., 8 Cal. 2d 211, 233, 64 P.2d 1081,
1085-086 (1937).
185. See note 47 and accomanying text supra.
186. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 65, §414, at 334.2-34.3.
187. See Warren, supra note 68, at 409-10.
188. See generally Maclntyre, The Development of Oil and Gas Ownership Theory in Canada, 4
U. BRrr. COLUM. L. REV. 245 (1969).
189. Langlois v. Canadian.Superior Oil of Cal. Ltd., 23 W.W.R. (n.s.) 401, 407 (1957).
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polestar or lodestar of interpretation, whether the form or nature of the
instrument, is always the same: To ascertain the will, or intent, of the
maker."' 0 The rules of interpretation were designed ultimately to as-
certain the intent of the parties.' 9'
California courts have recognized this principle and applied it to oil
and gas leases. In Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co. , 19
the court refused to alter the phraseology of the habendum clause to
preclude termination of the lease. In so doing, the court stated:
the elementary rule of construction, applicable to oil leases as well as
other documents, [is] that the function of the court is not to make a
new lease for the parties but to interpret the lease which they have
made, 'without regard to its wisdom or folly.' (citations omitted).,
93
California has joined with the majority of oil and gas states in implying
lease covenants when it was necessary to carry out the intended objec-
tives of the parties to the agreement.'
94
In light of this, the primary problem is not that the California courts
reject the view that an oil and gas lease has both express and implied
contractual features, but is that the courts fail to realize that common
law doctrines relating to landlord and tenant were founded on a now-
outdated view of the parties' intent, apparent from their acts and the
surrounding circumstances. For instance, at one time it was accurate to
state that retention of a reversionary interest by the assignor of a lease
evidenced his intent in fact to create a sublease and to adopt all of the
legal incidents recognized by the courts as flowing from that relation-
ship.' 95 Today, it is unrealistic to hold that retention of a reversion
should be determinative of the issue of the sublessee's liability to the
lessor for breaches of convenants in the original oil and gas lease.
196
When the parties to a lease use a technical legal term such as "assign-
ment," the courts should not adopt the property law meaning of the
word. Instead, they should look to the way the parties intended to use
the word in light of the object of the lease and the normal business
practices in the oil and gas industry.
In Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court
acknowledged that including technical property terms in an oil and gas
190. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §600 (3d ed. 1961).
191. Id.
192. 39 Cal. 2d 93, 244 P.2d 895 (1952).
193. See id. at 100, 244 P.2d at 899.
194. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957) (implied cove-
nant to develop the lease); Jones v. Interstate Oil Corp., 115 Cal. App. 302, 1 P.2d 1051 (1931)
(implied covenant to protect from drainage).
195. See notes 38-40 supra.
196. See Warren, supra note 68, at 409.
197. 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979).
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lease does not necessarily mean the parties intended to be bound by the
legal incidents a technical reading of the term would imply. The court
implied that the parties' intent was controlling:
If the term 'assignment,' used in the lease, may be construed as sy-
nonymous with 'transfer' or 'alienation' rather than as its more tech-
nical common law meaning would require, a question we need not
decide here, it is clear that alienation of separately severed lease-con-
ferred interests was clearly within the parties' contemplation.
198
California should adopt the view that the controlling principle for de-
termining the meaning of technical legal terms should be in accordance
with the parties' intent.
STATUTORY REFORM
The problem created by an inappropriate use of common law prop-
erty analogies may be corrected by legislative action as well as by a
change of judicial philosophy. Although a single legislative statute
cannot correct all of the problems that may arise from improper use of
property concepts, a few statutes could be tailored to correct the most
serious.
This comment proposes the following statute be enacted:
"To the extent of the interest acquired, an assignee or sublessee ac-
quires the rights and powers of the lessee and becomes responsible
directly to the original lessor for the performance of the lessee's obli-
gations of which he has notice at the time of taking interest." 199
This statute would conform more closely to the conduct of the oil
and gas business. The duty of a transferee of the lease would be clear:
to perform all covenants of the original lease. This duty would not
impose hardship upon the lease transferee because in the normal
course of business, he will assume the original covenants.20° The stat-
ute would protect lessors who failed to require an assumption by subse-
quent transferees.
Furthermore, because oil and gas leases are routinely recorded in-
struments, the transferee can be certain of the covenants for which he
will be liable. A search of the record will show all covenants of the
original lease as well as subsequent transfers. Should the lessee negoti-
ate a lease and include a term the parties clearly intended as personal
to the original lessee and not binding on subsequent transferees, the
burden then falls on the lessee to include language in the lease expres-
sing this intent. This burden is not unreasonable because in most in-
198. Id. at 700.
199. This proposed statute is taken verbatim from LA. MIN. CODE ANN. art. 128.
200. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
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stances the lessee is the oil producer and possesses detailed knowledge
of the oil and gas law. Presumably, he has the legal advice necessary to
avoid these pitfalls.
Should the lessee forget to include a term indicating personal liabil-
ity on a particular covenant, no irreversible loss would result because
his transferee is presumed to have knowledge of all the covenants of
record;2 ' he knows he will be bound to perform them. If the transferee
believes some of the covenants are undesirable, he is in a position to
adjust his burden when negotiating the terms under which the lease is
transferred to him from the original lessee.
A second problem which could be corrected by legislative action is to
preclude application of Civil Code Section 1945 and Code of Civil Pro-
cedure Section 1166 to oil and gas leases. Adopting the following stat-
ute would accomplish this:
Oil and gas royalties shall not be rent for the purpose of terminating
an oil and gas lease, for such reasons as are not included in the lease
under which the lessee holds. In addition, oil and gas royalties shall
not be considered rent for the purpose of raising a presumption of an
oil and gas lease from the conduct of parties to a prior oil and gas
lease.
The result of this statute would be that lease terms established by the
parties to an oil and gas lease would dictate their rights and would
control the duration of the lease. This would provide more certainty to
the lease and would prevent termination of the lease for reasons not
contemplated by the parties.
Adopting both of the above proposed statutes would provide that oil
and gas leases are not subject to the application of law intended to
apply to ordinary leases. The California Legislature has previously
recognized the differences that exist2"2 and has acted to preclude a rem-
edy for damages being applied to oil and gas leases.20 3
CONCLUSION
An oil and gas lease is a legal instrument tailored by the owner of the
mineral interest and the lessee to convey the right to explore, develop,
and produce oil and gas from beneath the surface.2°4 The lease is also
a contract creating rights and duties between the parties. The terms of
the contract may cover a wide range of activity including conducting
201. The recordation of an oil and gas lease is to be given the same effect as recordation of any
interest in real property. CAL. CiV. CODE. §1219. See also id. §1213.
202. CAL. CIV. CODE §1952A.
203. See 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 153 (1969).
204. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text supra.
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operations on the land, transferability of the lease, payment of royal-
ties, and limiting the duration of the lease.
California courts have applied the landlord and tenant distinction
between assignment and sublease of the lease.20 5 A sublease can be
created by the lessee's retention of an overriding royalty.2 °6 One result
is that without an assumption of the terms of the original lease by the
transferee, the lessee has no duty to the lessor for breach of conve-
nant.207 Such a result is contrary to the needs of the oil and gas busi-
ness; therefore, it should be abandoned, and the lessee should be held
liable on all covenants in the original lease of which he had knowledge
at the time he succeeded to the lease interest.
20 8
California courts have also analogized royalty to rent.20 9 This anal-
ogy has been relied on by the California Supreme Court to conclude
that tender and acceptance of royalty by the lessor after the lease has
expired creates a month-to-month tenancy which may only be termi-
nated by giving thirty days' notice.210 An argument exists, however,
that the lease is not terminated by such notice if the "thereafter" clause
is incorporated as a term of the implied tenancy." 1
The royalty to rent analogy exists as a basis for applying the unlaw-
ful detainer statute to return possession of the premises to the lessor
when the lessee delays making royalty payments. Such application
would provide the lessor with an unintended, uncontemplated, and un-
bargained-for remedy.
For these reasons, the courts should abandon the use of landlord and
tenant analogy, and the royalty and rent analogy as bases for determin-
ing the rights and duties between parties to an oil and gas lease. In-
stead, the lease should be viewed as a contract designed to respond to
the needs of the parties. Courts should construe the contract according
to the intent of the parties.212 The general intent of those engaged in
the oil business is to hold all subsequent transferees of the lease liable
to the lessor. Non-payment of royalty is not a ground for forfeiture of
the lease absent an express forfeiture clause, and acceptance of royalty
by the landlord should not serve as the basis for creating a lease
interest.
Although the courts can correct these problems, it may take time.
205. See notes 4348 and accompanying text supra.
206. See notes 49-61 and accompanying text supra.
207. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
208. See notes 189-201 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 110-114 and accompanying text supra.
210. See notes 131-136 and accompanying text supra.
211. See notes 152-155 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 191-201 and accompanying text supra.
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The legislature, therefore, should adopt specific legislation to provide
the corrective remedy.
Thomas danzen
